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IC-012 Polar expedition · Antarctica, the Ross Sea side 1916

The Ross Sea Party — three men died laying depots for a crossing that never came

Lost
3
Bound for
Mount Hope and the Beardmore Glacier
Ended
Ross Island, Antarctica, 1916
Status
Partial loss

Summary

The Ross Sea party was the forgotten half of Ernest Shackleton's 1914–17 Imperial Trans-Antarctic Expedition. While Shackleton attempted to cross Antarctica from the Weddell Sea, this second party, operating from the opposite Ross Sea coast under Captain Aeneas Mackintosh, was to lay a chain of supply depots southward across the Ross Ice Shelf to the foot of the Beardmore Glacier, so that Shackleton's crossing team would have food and fuel for the final stretch to McMurdo Sound. The depots were laid. The crossing never came: Shackleton's ship Endurance was crushed in the Weddell Sea pack before his party ever set foot on the continent. Three men of the Ross Sea party died completing depots for a journey that no one would ever make. Of the men stranded on the Antarctic side, seven survived and three did not.

The party's ordeal was compounded by the loss of its ship. On 7 May 1915 a gale tore the Aurora from her moorings off Cape Evans and drove her out to sea, locked in the pack, leaving ten men ashore with minimal supplies, clothing and equipment. Marooned, under-provisioned, and unaware that the crossing party would never come, those men nonetheless judged that lives depended on the depots being laid. They sledged south through two seasons, improvising clothing and gear, hauling loads in temperatures and conditions that broke their health, and completed the depot chain to Mount Hope at the foot of the Beardmore. The cost was severe: scurvy, frostbite, snow-blindness and exhaustion ground the men down on journeys lasting months.

Arnold Spencer-Smith, the expedition's chaplain and photographer, collapsed with scurvy on the return from the farthest depots and died on the ice on 9 March 1916, carried on a sledge to the end. Two months later, on 8 May 1916, Mackintosh and Victor Hayward walked out from Hut Point toward Cape Evans across newly formed, unstable sea ice during a blizzard, against advice, and were never seen again — almost certainly drowned when the ice broke up. The survivors were rescued in January 1917 by the refitted Aurora, with Shackleton himself aboard. They learned that the depots they had nearly died to lay had been needed by no one. It remains one of polar history's bleakest demonstrations of effort and sacrifice rendered futile by a failure half a continent away.

Timeline

Dec 1914
Departure from Australia
The Aurora, under Aeneas Mackintosh, sails from Sydney for the Ross Sea to support Shackleton's planned crossing from the far side of Antarctica.
Jan 1915
Base at Cape Evans
A shore party establishes itself on Ross Island and begins the first season of depot-laying across the Ross Ice Shelf.
7 May 1915
The ship is lost
A gale rips the Aurora from her moorings and carries her out to sea in the pack ice, marooning ten men ashore with scant supplies.
1915
A winter of want
The stranded party scavenges supplies left by earlier expeditions and prepares, despite everything, to complete the depot chain.
Oct 1915
The great depot journey begins
The men set out to lay the southern depots to Mount Hope, hauling loads by hand and dog over hundreds of miles.
Jan 1916
The farthest depot
The party reaches Mount Hope at the foot of the Beardmore Glacier and completes the depot chain Shackleton's crossing would have used.
Feb–Mar 1916
Scurvy on the return
On the long march back, several men collapse with scurvy; Spencer-Smith can no longer walk and is hauled on a sledge.
9 Mar 1916
Spencer-Smith dies
The chaplain Arnold Spencer-Smith dies of scurvy and exhaustion on the ice shelf and is buried where he fell.
8 May 1916
Mackintosh and Hayward vanish
Against advice, the two men set out from Hut Point across thin sea ice in a blizzard and are never seen again.
10 Jan 1917
Rescue
The refitted Aurora, with Shackleton aboard, reaches Cape Evans and takes off the seven survivors.
1917
The futility revealed
The survivors learn that Endurance was crushed and the crossing never began, making the depots — and the deaths — unnecessary.

The far side of an expedition split in two

Shackleton's plan for the Imperial Trans-Antarctic Expedition was geographically immense: a single party would cross the entire Antarctic continent on foot, from the Weddell Sea coast, over the Pole, to the Ross Sea on the opposite side. No party could carry enough food and fuel for so long a march. The scheme therefore depended on a second, supporting expedition working from the Ross Sea end — laying a line of well-stocked depots southward across the Ross Ice Shelf to the foot of the Beardmore Glacier, so that the crossing party, arriving exhausted and short of supplies, would find food waiting all the way back to base. Without them, the crossing party would starve in its final hundreds of miles.

That supporting role fell to the Ross Sea party, carried south aboard the Aurora under Aeneas Mackintosh. It was, from the start, the poorer cousin of the expedition: funding thin, the men less experienced than Shackleton's hand-picked Weddell team, the equipment inadequate. Ten men were to be put ashore on Ross Island to do the sledging while the Aurora wintered at her moorings as a floating base. The whole structure assumed two things that did not hold: that the ship would stay put, and that there would be a crossing party to feed. Neither assumption survived 1915.

The dependency ran one way and blind. The Ross Sea men could not know what was happening to Shackleton across the continent, and he could not tell them that his own ship had been beset and crushed before his party even landed. So the depot-layers worked on, in good faith, toward a rendezvous that the Weddell disaster had already cancelled — pouring their strength into a lifeline for men who were not coming.

The ship blown away and the depots laid in extremity

The first blow was the loss of the Aurora. On 7 May 1915 a severe gale tore the ship from her moorings off Cape Evans and drove her out to sea, frozen into the pack. She would drift for months before breaking free and limping, damaged, to New Zealand, unable to return. Ashore, ten men were left marooned — without much of their clothing, food, fuel and equipment, which had been aboard or never properly landed — expected to lay depots across hundreds of miles of ice shelf using whatever they could scavenge from the huts and caches of earlier expeditions.

They chose to do it anyway. Reasoning that the crossing party's lives depended on the depots, the men sledged south through the 1915–16 season on punishing journeys, the longest lasting some six months on the trail. They man-hauled and drove dogs across the Ross Ice Shelf, improvising gear, eating into reserves of strength they could not replace, and pushed the depot chain all the way to Mount Hope at the foot of the Beardmore Glacier — the precise point Shackleton's plan required. By the measure of the task assigned, the Ross Sea party succeeded completely.

The success destroyed the men who achieved it. Months on the ice with an inadequate diet brought on scurvy; the cold brought frostbite and snow-blindness; the labour brought a deep, cumulative exhaustion. On the long return from the southern depots, the chaplain Arnold Spencer-Smith — who also served as photographer — grew too weak to walk. His companions loaded him onto a sledge and hauled him north, themselves scorbutic and failing, for weeks. On 9 March 1916 he died on the ice shelf and was buried where he fell. He was the first of the three.

The reckoning: thin ice, and a sacrifice for nothing

The survivors of the depot journey reached Hut Point, an old shelter on Ross Island, alive but wrecked — scorbutic, frostbitten, and separated from the better-equipped base at Cape Evans by a stretch of sea ice that had not yet frozen solid. The sensible course was to wait at Hut Point until the sea ice set hard enough to cross safely. Mackintosh, the party's leader, and Victor Hayward chose not to wait. On 8 May 1916, with a blizzard rising, the two men announced they would walk across to Cape Evans over the new, thin ice, and set out despite warnings from the others. They were never seen again. The sea ice almost certainly broke up beneath them in the storm and carried them off; their bodies were never found. They were the second and third deaths.

The remaining men endured the rest of the year at Cape Evans and were finally relieved on 10 January 1917, when the Aurora — salvaged, repaired and refitted in New Zealand — returned with Shackleton himself aboard, anxious to recover the party he had left on the far side of the world. Seven men came home. They then learned the full shape of what had happened: that Endurance had been crushed in the Weddell Sea in 1915, that Shackleton's crossing party had never landed, that the famous open-boat saga of Elephant Island and South Georgia had unfolded while they laboured, and that the depots they had nearly died to lay had never been needed by anyone. Spencer-Smith, Mackintosh and Hayward had died for a crossing that the other half of the expedition had already made impossible — a sacrifice complete, faithful, and entirely in vain.

The Five Factors

01
A plan that split its single point of failure
The whole expedition rested on two independent parties succeeding together, with no margin if either failed. When the Weddell side collapsed, the Ross side's labour became pointless, yet the design gave the depot-layers no way to know it. A scheme in which one half's effort is voided by the other's failure, with no communication between them, builds futility into its bones.
02
The supporting party as the neglected party
The Ross Sea team was under-funded, under-experienced and under-equipped relative to Shackleton's hand-picked crossing team, because it was seen as merely supporting. The men tasked with the unglamorous, dangerous logistics were given the thinnest resources — and they were the ones who died.
03
No fallback when the ship was lost
When the Aurora was blown out to sea, the shore party had no ship, no reserve of clothing and fuel, and no contingency for being marooned. They were left to improvise survival and labour from the scraps of earlier expeditions. A plan that has no answer to the loss of its base ship has no answer at all.
04
Mission commitment beyond reason
Stranded and unsupplied, the men still drove themselves to lay every depot to Mount Hope because they believed lives depended on it. Their devotion was genuine and, as it turned out, fatal and pointless. Commitment to a goal can become a trap when the goal's premise has silently disappeared and no one is left to call it off.
05
Defying the ice in a hurry
The final two deaths came from a single decision to cross unstable new sea ice in a blizzard rather than wait days for it to harden. Exhausted men, near safety, gambled on terrain that did not need to be crossed yet. Impatience at the last stage, against the plain hazard of thin ice, killed the leader and one more.

Aftermath

The Ross Sea party returned to a world that had eyes only for Shackleton's Weddell Sea epic — the loss of Endurance, the camp on the ice, the boat journey to Elephant Island, and the open-boat crossing to South Georgia in which all 28 men survived. Against that miracle of survival, the Ross Sea story was grim and unredeemed: three dead, the survivors broken in health, and the entire enterprise revealed as futile. For decades it remained the overlooked half of the expedition, its men largely uncelebrated.

History has since restored some of their due. The depot-laying was a feat of endurance and discipline equal in hardship to anything on the Weddell side, accomplished by a marooned, ill-equipped party that nonetheless did exactly what was asked of it. The deaths of Spencer-Smith, Mackintosh and Hayward are now recorded among the costs of the Heroic Age of Antarctic exploration, and the relief voyage of the salvaged Aurora, with Shackleton aboard, closed the expedition's books. What endures is the particular cruelty of their sacrifice: men who gave their lives, faithfully and well, to lay supplies for travellers who were never coming, on the far side of a continent from the disaster that had already made their work meaningless.

Lessons

  1. Beware plans whose halves depend on each other with no line of communication: when one fails, the other may keep dying for a goal that no longer exists.
  2. Resource the unglamorous logistics as seriously as the headline objective; the supporting party often faces the same lethal terrain with worse equipment.
  3. Build a real contingency for losing your base or ship, not a hope that it will hold; a marooned party with no reserves is one storm from disaster.
  4. Watch for commitment that outlives its purpose — devotion to a mission can drive exhausted people past the point where the mission still makes sense.
  5. Never rush thin ice or unstable terrain when waiting is an option; the last short stretch near safety is where impatience kills.

References